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Managing Territorial Disputes in  
Southeast Asia: Is There More than the 
South China Sea? 
Nicole Jenne  
Abstract: The conflicts in the South China Sea have come to dominate 
debates on Southeast Asian security and specifically on how boundary 
disputes have been managed within the region. Yet, the case is not nec-
essarily exemplary for the way Southeast Asian countries have dealt with 
territorial disputes generally. The article gathers three common percep-
tions about conflict management that are strongly informed by the South 
China Sea case, but have lesser relevance when looking at other territori-
al conflicts in the region. I offer a critical reading of the who, why, and 
how of territorial conflict management and provide tentative guidelines 
on what to expect in the future.  
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Introduction 
Over the past years, the ongoing disputes in the South China Sea have 
attracted increasing attention to territorial conflicts over land features 
and maritime areas in the Asia-Pacific. The “cottage industry” (Klint-
worth 1994: 211) that developed around China’s rise to power tended to 
overshadow the many other cases of territorial disagreements in the 
region. In the light of the South China Sea problem, this article1 shows, 
other dispute cases are easily misunderstood. The South China Sea is far 
from being a typical case and therefore fails to lend itself to direct com-
parisons with other territorial disputes in the region. 
The special character of the South China Sea problem is well known. 
The conflicts involve a series of disputes over the control of islands and 
ocean areas between two and sometimes more states (see Hayton 2014). 
Together, there are at least six parties directly involved: China, which 
claims the largest area by far according to its infamous nine-dash line, 
Taiwan, and the four Southeast Asian states of Brunei, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Vietnam, which are also members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). There is a fifth ASEAN member 
state, Indonesia, whose claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ) bound-
ary overlaps with China’s nine-dash line. Yet, Indonesia has only taken 
minimal actions and instead positioned itself as an honest broker in the 
dispute. Since an EEZ is a zone of jurisdiction but not of sovereignty, 
the authorities mostly preferred to hide behind the cover of not being an 
official party to the dispute, a position they began to revisit only recently 
and with utmost care (Supriyanto 2016). 
In addition to the multiplicity of actors, the South China Sea issue is 
further complicated by the fact that it involves China, the region’s domi-
nant power, thus creating important stakes for the United States in the 
dispute. Although the case is therefore not emblematic of the many 
other territorial disputes in the region, its very prominence risks reinforc-
ing a number of biased perceptions about dispute management in South-
east Asia. To make matters worse, the disagreements over the South 
China Sea are sometimes poorly understood. Superficial analyses surely 
have done little to help better understand of how similar issues have 
been managed elsewhere in the region. 
                                                 
1 This article is based on a talk given at the Center of Asian Studies, Pontificia 
Universidad Católica de Chile, 24 August 2016, which was subsequently pub-
lished as a working paper (Jenne 2016). I gratefully acknowledge the financial 
support from the PUC Office of the Vice Rector of Research, which made fur-
ther development of the manuscript possible. 
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This article offers a critical reading of several claims regarding dis-
pute management in Southeast Asia. These are found in media outlets 
but also in academic productions where a number of misperceptions 
have escaped closer scrutiny. The number of studies that deal systemati-
cally with border conflicts in Southeast Asia is surprisingly small, despite 
the fact that territorial issues have played an important role in the re-
gion.2 Likely due to the generally low level of public visibility territorial 
disputes attract scholarly interest has been sporadic, case-specific, and 
often descriptive.  
The objective of the present discussion is not to refute the domi-
nant narratives altogether; in fact, some of the propositions developed 
here do not contradict the claims I take issue with. Instead, the article 
contributes to the debate with details that complicate an all too simpli-
fied reading and thus lead to at times radically different conclusions. 
Furthermore, I uncover a number of blind spots, which, for different 
reasons, have received scant attention in the literature. To be clear, the 
article offers little in the way of elucidating the debates on the South 
China Sea. Rather, for the purpose of this study, I use that case to show 
how perceptions of international dispute management in Southeast Asia 
have been biased towards the rather exceptional challenge in the South 
China Sea, and to highlight how other cases differ.  
The individual claims consecutively discussed in the article are 
grouped into three broad positions that address the who, why, and how of 
territorial disputes and their management in Southeast Asia. The first 
position, on the who in dispute management, tends to overestimate the 
role of third parties, specifically the role of external security guarantors 
and ASEAN (Kivimäki 2001; Buzan and Wæver 2003: 144–171). The 
second position holds that the question of why these disputes exist can be 
answered by reference to aggressive foreign policy attitudes, especially in 
situations of domestic instability (Blanchard 2003). The third perception 
leans towards the other extreme. This set of arguments on the question 
of how disputes have been managed posits that Southeast Asia has devel-
oped a particular way to address conflicts. Accordingly, an Asian values-
inspired “ASEAN Way” has been characterised by an anti-legalist atti-
tude and a tendency to avoid, rather than to resolve conflict (Busse 1999; 
Acharya 2001). Before discussing the three positions, the next section 
begins with an overview of territorial disputes in the region. 
                                                 
2 Exceptions dealing with territorial disputes not limited to a particular case are 
Amer (1998) and Amer and Nguyen (2009).  
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Southeast Asia’s Territorial Disputes 
The bigger part of Southeast Asia’s contemporary borders stems from 
the time of the European empires. Where boundaries had previously 
been fluid, the European settlers drew lines to halt the advancement of 
their rivals. The British came to dominate the western parts of the region, 
comprising contemporary Myanmar, Malaysia and Singapore. In the east, 
the French occupied the peninsular countries of today’s Laos, Vietnam 
and Cambodia. The Dutch claimed the islands of Indonesia, and the 
current state of the Philippines was first colonized by Spain and later 
transferred to the United States. Only Thailand maintained its formal 
independence thanks to its geographical position as a buffer zone be-
tween Great Britain and France. In real terms, the autonomy of Siam, as 
Thailand was called, was severely compromised and the European influ-
ence on its territorial extension and conceptions of territoriality strong 
(Thongchai Winichakul 1994). 
When the countries of Southeast Asia gained independence after 
the Second World War, the limits of the colonial administrations became 
the new international borders. Together with the new states, however, 
came a considerable number of overlapping territorial claims, though 
many would be discovered only years later. The boundaries left over 
from colonial times were ambiguous and/or poorly demarcated, or had 
simply never been defined. The colonial-time provisions were fewer still 
in the maritime realm, given that the contemporary regime of the ocean 
law developed significantly only in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
Despite the difficulties, there have been only three significant changes in 
Southeast Asia’s territorial order since independence: in 1965, when 
Singapore split away from Malaysia; in 1975, with the merger of what 
had been known as North and South Vietnam; and in 2002, when Indo-
nesia ended its occupation of Timor-Leste, which it had invaded in 1975, 
nine days after the latter’s independence from Portugal.  
During the Cold War, progress in delimiting and demarcating the 
borders of the newly independent states was difficult, if not impossible, 
due to the violence on the Southeast Asian peninsula. Between the 
Southeast Asian countries standing on opposite sides in the superpower 
conflict, no serious attempt was undertaken to negotiate overlapping 
claims. Within the communist grouping, Vietnam and Laos resolved 
some disagreements through a treaty signed in July 1977. The treaty 
returned to Laos territory that North Vietnamese troops had “borrowed” 
for the Ho Chi Minh trail in the independence struggles (Le Thai Hoang 
2007: 11). The document was not made public until 1986 and raised 
suspicions that the Hanoi-dependent Laotian government had been 
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lured into undue concessions. Yet, according to the probably best availa-
ble English-language source, the “agreements and demarcation were not 
to [Laos’] detriment, that is, Laos did not have to give up substantial 
areas” (Amer and Hong Thao 2005: 432). Since March 2016, with the 
planting of the last of 1,002 border markers, the demarcation of the 
Lao–Vietnamese border has been considered complete.  
Along Vietnam’s border with Cambodia, close to no progress was 
made. During the time Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge ruled in Phnom 
Penh, Hanoi’s attempts to reach a treaty similar to the one with Laos 
were overtaken by a series of events that eventually led the Vietnamese 
to invade Cambodia (Heder 1979). With the new, Vietnamese-installed 
government of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), Hanoi con-
cluded the Agreement on Historical Waters (1982), the Agreement on 
the Principle for Settlement of Border Disputes (1983), and the Treaty 
on Delimitation (1985). The agreements have since been bitterly contest-
ed. In 1996, Cambodia’s King Sihanouk and then co-prime minister 
Norodom Ranariddh publicly declared the provisions null and void. 
Protests demanding their abrogation have turned violent on several oc-
casions, most recently in 2015 (Straits Times 2015). To understand the 
virulent opposition, the border issue needs to be placed in the historical 
context of Cambodian politics and anti-Vietnamese sentiments (Thayer 
2012). Today’s ruling elite is still largely the same that sat at the negotia-
tion table when the boundary agreements were made, and increasing 
discontent with its crony capitalism over the past years has turned the 
border into one of the main programmatic items for the otherwise weak-
ly organised political opposition.  
With regards to the individual provisions of the existing agreements, 
the few available independent studies conclude that the treaties from the 
1980s conform to standard practices in international law.3 Regarding the 
framework agreements on maritime boundaries, the terms are sufficient-
ly broad for a detailed study to note that “the observer is left with serious 
questions of what actually has been settled” (Farrell 1992: 335). On the 
land border, a comparison between the geographical coordinates of the 
1985 treaty and maps used by both sides suggests that “very few, and 
very minor, changes were effected in the old borders” (Vickery 2011: 
40–42). Given the prevailing political sensitivity, however, the two coun-
tries still have not been able to resolve the pending issues on the land 
border, the original target date of which was 2012.  
                                                 
3 Interview with Clive Schofield, a leading oceans scholar at the Australian Cen-
tre for Ocean Resource and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, 
Singapore, 24 September 2013. 
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While the communist grouping achieved only modest progress on 
settling their borders during the Cold War, the states of non-communist, 
Western-aligned Southeast Asia suspended pending boundary negotia-
tions almost entirely. They felt that, in the face of more pressing issues, 
cooperation was needed and the potentially conflictive overlapping 
claims were too risky to be openly discussed. Towards the mid-1960s, a 
regional association was seen as the best choice to maintain some degree 
of autonomy whilst ensuring the United States’ continued involvement 
against the communist advances in Southeast Asia. It is one of ASEAN’s 
frequently told success stories that the Philippines and Malaysia shelved 
the conflict over the Malay state of Sabah to allow ASEAN to survive – 
unlike its predecessor, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), which 
had effectively been shut down when the Philippines laid claim to Sabah 
(Turnbull 1992: 615–617). Although the Philippines have not actively 
pursued their claim since, the issue has led to irritations as recently as in 
2013 with the so-called Lahad Datu incident and is yet to be resolved.  
Another, similar example of delayed boundary settlement is Indone-
sia. During the Cold War, Indonesia concluded maritime boundary trea-
ties with two of its five Southeast Asian neighbours, Thailand (1971) and 
Malaysia (1969, 1970), only because these were seen as essential to 
achieving the international recognition of its status as an archipelagic 
state (Butcher 2009). Beyond what in Indonesia was seen as a question 
of survival, however, pending questions were put on hold in order not to 
threaten the fragile cooperation within ASEAN. 
Soon after the Cold War ended and the 1991 Paris Peace Accords 
formalised Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia, ASEAN welcomed 
four new members: Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997), and 
Cambodia (1999). Vietnam was the first country to make significant 
progress in delimiting its maritime boundaries (Amer and Hong Thao 
2005). As a former director of the Political Affairs Division in the 
ASEAN Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained, “With 
all these ASEAN meetings it was now easy for us to talk to them, and we 
had long everything prepared to settle the border.”4 Thailand, which had 
begun a policy of rapprochement with the Indochinese countries under 
Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan (1986–1991), set up Joint Border 
Commissions successively with Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia, copying 
a long-standing, similar working group with Malaysia.  
Border settlement also made headway amongst the original ASEAN 
members: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) resolved territorial 
                                                 
4 Interview with Nguyen Hung Son, Hanoi, 17 October 2013. 
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disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia over the islands of Sipadan and 
Ligitan (2002), between Malaysia and Singapore over the three maritime 
features of Pedra Branca/Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge 
(2008), and between Cambodia and Thailand (2013) over the interpreta-
tion of a previous judgement from the ICJ over the ownership of the 
temple of Preah Vihear from 1962. Nonetheless, all of Southeast Asia’s 
states still have territorial conflicts pending resolution with at least one of 
their neighbours.  
It is impossible to state with any certainty how many remaining dis-
putes there are since some borders are still to be surveyed. In other 
words, not all existing disagreements have yet been formally expressed. 
This should be borne in mind when using territorial disputes databases 
(Huth 1996; Huth and Allee 2002; Hensel et al. 2008), especially with 
regards to the Southeast Asian mainland, where several states have yet to 
acknowledge the existence of conflicting interpretations over their bor-
ders. Hence, territorial disputes are likely to remain on the political agen-
da at least in the mid-term and it is therefore important to understand 
the patterns of how these have been managed. The next section address-
es the who of territorial conflict management, specifically the role of third 
parties. As in the subsequently following sections on the why and how of 
territorial disputes and their management, I begin by sketching a set of 
dominant assumptions about the South China Sea disputes before dis-
cussing them in the light of Southeast Asia’s bilateral, intraregional dis-
putes. In each section, I show that the claims based on the South China 
Sea case are not easily applicable to other territorial disputes in the region. 
The selected claims discussed in the remainder either tend to reinforce 
existing misperception about territorial disputes in Southeast Asia, or 
lead straight to incomplete and sometimes incorrect assertions. 
Who? The Overrated Roles of External Security 
Guarantors and ASEAN  
Issues of territory are known to be the most contentious in international 
politics. The probability that border issues will escalate into armed con-
flict depends on their strategic, economic, and symbolic importance. 
Such variation notwithstanding, however, research is unanimous in 
showing that territorial disagreements bear an inherent risk of interstate 
violence (Senese 2005; Hensel et al. 2008). Despite Southeast Asia’s 
many territorial squabbles, the region experienced only two wars that 
changed its international borders: the war that ended up unifying Vi-
etnam, and Indonesia’s occupation of Timor-Leste. The fact that both 
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occurred in the same year of 1975 is not coincidental. Independently of 
each other, the two events were strongly influenced by the bipolar sys-
tem of the Cold War and the direct involvement of its protagonists. 
Other than those two wars, which were really wars of state formation, 
Southeast Asian countries have managed interstate disputes short of 
armed conflict. Two commonly found explanations for the absence of 
major interstate war are the involvement of the great powers and of 
ASEAN. Reference to third parties playing a mitigating role in conflict, 
however, appears to be grounded in the South China Sea experience and 
has lesser relevance in other disputes between Southeast Asian countries. 
I consider each of them in turn.  
The Great Powers  
With tensions in the South China Sea on the rise over the past several 
years, observers have frequently described the waters as a “flashpoint” of 
competing great-power aspirations, on not only a regional but also a 
global scale. The point is not so much that “rising China” is one of the 
parties to the dispute, but how “this critical body of water” is turned into 
a chessboard of international politics (Cronin and Kaplan 2012; Hayton 
2014; Kaplan 2014; Lin 2015; for a critique see Taylor 2014). The claim 
is succinctly summarised in the following statement by Cronin and 
Kaplan (2012: 7):  
As the decades-old rules-based system fostered by the United 
States is being called into question by a rising China, the South 
China Sea will be the strategic bellwether for determining the fu-
ture of U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Using the same logic, observers have been quick to interpret the ups and 
downs in Southeast Asia’s bilateral disputes in the context of ostensive 
great-power strategies, including but not limited to those of China and 
the United States together with the latter’s Asian allies (Storey 2011). 
Consequently, we are led to believe that Southeast Asia’s significantly 
stable international order was the result of some type of overarching 
great-power balance (White 2008), a view that is both theoretically and 
empirically questionable. Unless one assumes that balance-of-power 
politics produced Southeast Asia’s territorial peace by default, neither a 
macro-regional nor a global balancing logic can provide a satisfactory 
answer to the stability-despite-territorial-disputes puzzle. As Acharya and 
Tan aptly put it,  
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Quite possibly the most glaring thing about Southeast Asian inter-
national relations is the absence of any clear sense of grand strate-
gic coherence or orderliness in the ways in which Southeast Asians 
and extra-regional powers manage the security of the region. 
(Acharya and Tan 2006: 40) 
Regardless of the power position one is willing to concede to China, the 
United States’ preeminent position globally and in Southeast Asia re-
mains unmatched (Beckley 2011). Theoretically, however, the effect of a 
hegemonic power is ambiguous: On the one hand, the existence of a 
hegemon can increase conflict between secondary powers (“proxy wars”) 
in both number and intensity. On the other hand, hegemonic influence 
can lead to greater stability, either through intervention for the benefit of 
maintaining order, or through an indirect effect that occurs when subor-
dinate states cooperate to counterbalance the hegemon’s power. The 
hegemonic-stability argument relies on two conditions, the hegemon’s 
willingness to enforce compliance and its capacity to do so. As these 
factors naturally fluctuate, so also did the effect of the United States’ 
preponderance in Southeast Asia. 
Washington’s rebalance to Asia in recent years increased its visibility 
in the region again. Nevertheless, the “pivot” did not effect the direct 
involvement of Washington in Southeast Asia’s intraregional disputes. 
Any direct action would have aroused resentments with other major 
players in the region, in particular China but also the United States’ alli-
ance partners in Tokyo, a cost that the White House would hardly as-
sume since the US lacks vital interests in Southeast Asia’s territorial dis-
putes. This was evident in the most recent, widely publicised case of a 
border dispute that led to a series of military clashes between Cambodia 
and Thailand. In the course of three years, between 2008 and 2011, 
Cambodia appealed twice to the UN Security Council but failed to 
achieve its objectives since both the United States and China preferred 
not to take sides (Jones and Jenne 2016). After addressing the council for 
the first time in July 2008, Cambodia, under Thai pressure and absent the 
support of China and the United States, eventually withdrew its request 
for a hearing. The second time, in February 2011, Cambodia insisted that 
the Security Council deal with the matter; although the Security Council 
then took the matter under consideration, in the end its response was to 
merely inform the parties that the conflict should be handled through 
regional and bilateral means. Since ASEAN, the primary regional organi-
sation, was little able to improve the situation, the conflict between 
Cambodia and Thailand followed its own logic, eventually returning to 
quiet along the border without the great powers having played a role. 
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From a Southeast Asian perspective, it is important to note that 
when countries have sought external security guarantees, they have at the 
same time striven to protect their autonomy. No country in the region 
could be assured of third-party support in a bilateral dispute, and in fact 
no open request for another state’s assistance has been reported. Under 
ASEAN, Southeast Asian states promoted the slogan of “resilience 
through capacity building” to describe their joint efforts to prevent for-
eign involvement (Anwar 2000). Even though external assurances were 
generally invited as part of governments’ hedging strategies (Kuik 2016), 
at the very least they followed what a senior Thai Foreign Ministry offi-
cial called “the rules of the slum,” saying, “If you are so close together 
you must shut your ears and eyes, pretending that you don’t notice what 
is going on next door.”5 
Due to Southeast Asia’s internal strategic incoherence, however, it 
cannot be concluded that cooperation amongst the ASEAN states was a 
strategy to counter hegemony and that this was the reason why serious 
conflict has been avoided. For instance, since the turn of the millennium, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, together with Singapore and Thailand, have 
collaborated in various cooperation schemes to prevent great-power 
interference in the Straits of Malacca. Although generally seen as success-
ful, this had little impact on a conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia 
over maritime areas further east that have not been delimited, which has 
led to repeated irritations in their relations over the past decade. The so-
called Ambalat conflict saw various military standoffs, in none of which 
either of the two parties attempted to involve an external actor. More-
over, it is highly unlikely that the United States would have risked alienat-
ing Indonesia, the world’s biggest Muslim-majority democracy and an 
important partner in the fight against Islamist terrorism, by involving 
itself in a bilateral conflict. It needs to be concluded, therefore, that alt-
hough any account of Southeast Asian interstate relations is certainly 
incomplete without appropriately acknowledging the role of the great 
powers, the management of territorial disputes within the region is not 
reducible to them. 
  
                                                 
5 Interview, 28 July 2014 (place omitted).  
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ASEAN 
Consider now the opposite position, which asserts that far from being 
pawns of the great powers, Southeast Asian states have successfully 
exploited rivalries between the great powers to establish an ASEAN-
centred regional-security architecture (Caballero-Anthony 2014). Follow-
ing this reading, ASEAN, being the most strongly institutionalised re-
gional organisation within a wider net of overlapping multilateral fora 
and institutions, is to be credited for successful conflict management 
within the region. When looking beyond the South China Sea, however, 
the claim overemphasises the role of the organisation as an actor pro-
moting a particular set of norms and principles. The South China Sea is a 
critical case for the advocates of ASEAN-led regionalism, who see the 
ASEAN-proposed rules to regulate the overlapping claims areas as lying 
at the heart of what constitutes the organisation’s self-proclaimed 
“ASEAN-centrality” (Terada 2012; Ba 2016). Consequently, ASEAN’s 
fate is said to depend on whether or not it can “cope with China” (Ba 
2006; Beeson 2015). Put into historical context, if in the past ASEAN 
was accused of being a “one-issue organisation” merely concerning itself 
with the Vietnamese in Cambodia, its litmus test has since come to be 
the developments in the South China Sea (Tong 2016). 
With regard to the management of territorial conflicts in Southeast 
Asia generally, drawing lessons from the South China Sea entails judging 
the organisation according to a biased metric. The two positions on the 
relevance of ASEAN as an actor are well known (Acharya 2009; Eaton 
and Stubbs 2006): on one side, observers have argued that ASEAN is a 
powerless institution because it failed to get active in territorial disputes, 
while others have countered that the organisation was in fact able to 
facilitate dialogue amongst its members despite its lack of sanctioning 
mechanisms (Emmers 2017). However, the debate over whether 
ASEAN has contributed to the peaceful handling of disputes loses sight 
of the key question: Have its members envisaged a role for the organisa-
tion in managing interstate disputes? The short answer is no. ASEAN 
does not (even pretend to) play a role in dealing with territorial issues 
beyond providing a space for personal encounters. While ASEAN’s 
constituent legal framework, the Charter of 2007, commits members to 
resolving their conflicts peacefully, it fails to associate a mandatory in-
strument with the provision. The long answer to the question of what 
type of actor ASEAN wants to be is slightly more complicated, though 
not fundamentally different, from the question about the role it sees 
itself playing in interstate disputes. Some key actors within ASEAN have 
hoped that the organisation could play a role in managing interstate dis-
  46 Nicole Jenne 
 
putes, an idea promoted mainly by Indonesia, by individual supporters of 
a region-wide push for democratisation, and by the Group of Eminent 
Persons who advised the ASEAN governments in preparing the Charter 
(ASEAN 2006). Yet, the general consensus in the association has re-
mained that states would not compromise on their sovereignty by giving 
ASEAN the option or legitimation to intervene in matters the members 
consider of exclusive national competence. 
The above-mentioned conflict between Cambodia and Thailand of-
fered a possibly unprecedented opportunity for ASEAN to involve itself 
in a bilateral dispute (ICG 2011). Yet, the majority of its member states 
were reluctant to even issue a statement on the conflict; even Indonesia, 
under a proactive foreign minister and with the institutional blessing to 
act as ASEAN chair, proceeded with utmost caution in seeking to facili-
tate talks between the conflict parties.6 The ASEAN Secretariat called 
“the fact that the ASEAN Ministers [were] meeting specifically on the 
issue of the bilateral dispute” a “historic first” (ASEAN 2011). However, 
it is telling that the same day Cambodia and Thailand resumed the Indo-
nesian-sponsored talks in the city of Bogor, relations between Indonesia 
and Malaysia turned sour. That day, 7 April 2011, saw another spat in a 
long series of incidents over fishing rights in a disputed EEZ in the 
Straits of Malacca (Arsana 2011). “Indeed, the tension between Indone-
sia and Malaysia, and the silence of ASEAN,” one of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy intellectuals complained, “has once again demonstrated the grow-
ing irrelevance of the association” (Sukma 2005). 
ASEAN had little influence in bilateral disputes apart from what its 
members were willing to allow it – and that was hardly anything. Of 
course, it must be said that Southeast Asia is no exception in this regard, 
as the incentives for countries to put their territorial disputes into the 
hands of an international organisation are minimal. Moreover, elevating 
the question of ASEAN’s role in territorial disputes to a life-or-death 
question for the organisation seems unwarranted, considering that it has 
always lived with the problems of overlapping territorial claims. Thus, 
the fact that ASEAN has not been able to agree on the details of a code 
of conduct in the South China Sea does not mean the organisation is at a 
standstill. In fact, it should not surprise anyone, as the complexity of 
                                                 
6 Interviews with Derry Aman, then deputy director for Political Cooperation at 
the Directorate of ASEAN Political-Security Community, Directorate-General 
of ASEAN Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Indonesia, and Jose 
Tavares, Director for ASEAN Dialogue Partners’ and Inter-Regional Coopera-
tion at the Directorate General of ASEAN Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Indonesia, both Jakarta, 19 November 2013. See also ICG (2011). 
  Managing Territorial Disputes in Southeast Asia 47
 

 
agreeing on a regulatory framework for a disputed area is considerable 
even when it involves just two countries. Malaysia and Indonesia, for 
example, have tried to find a formula for developing standards of con-
duct under an Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) for two decades. 
Malaysia has sought to use the INCSEA with Indonesia as a model for 
agreements with other neighbouring states, but the future of the agree-
ment is unclear, since the two countries have so far failed to agree even 
on an area where the provisions would apply. In the case of the South 
China Sea, such obstacles would need to be overcome by not two, but 
four ASEAN states.  
Despite disagreements on specific matters, however, perhaps 
ASEAN’s most significant achievement has been its ability not to let 
these disagreements affect relations generally, a phenomenon that the 
ASEAN literature knows as “bracketing” (Leifer 1999: 26; Jetschke and 
Rüland 2009). Thanks to ASEAN’s bracketing capacity, it is unlikely that 
diverging preferences regarding China and the future handling of the 
South China Sea disputes will affect the way in which other territorial 
disputes in the region are dealt with.  
Many ASEAN scholars have argued that Southeast Asian interna-
tional politics is best described as “a web of overlapping bilateral coop-
eration” (Caballero-Anthony 2005: 199). Territorial dispute management 
between the ASEAN states has been a bilateral affair in the past and is 
likely to remain so in the future. Consequently, I have argued that the 
role of the great powers and of ASEAN should not be overrated. Both 
need to be considered together with other factors that are important to 
explain why territorial disputes have generally been managed peacefully 
and have only rarely led to violent conflict in the region. On the global 
level, the impediments to annexing territory are extraordinarily high 
today due to the development of international law and multilateral insti-
tutions that prohibit the forceful alteration of international borders 
(Zacher 2001). Another factor that has played in favour of the non-
violent handling of ASEAN border conflicts is surely the fact that no 
member state, except for the city-state of Singapore, has developed a 
military prepared to fight external wars. Not least, territorial disputes 
short of war are not necessarily difficult to manage, as I will discuss next. 
As in the other sections, I demonstrate that assertions derived from the 
case of the South China Sea – whether rightly or wrongly so – are un-
suitable vis-à-vis other dispute cases in Southeast Asia, risking that we 
draw incorrect conclusions. 
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Why? The Overrated Motives of Revisionism 
and Internal Politics 
Territorial disputes are commonly attributed to bad intentions and trou-
blemakers. Warring parties often accuse each other of harbouring expan-
sionist motives, but there is also another, widespread perception that 
territorial conflicts have in fact little to do with territorial issues them-
selves. Instead, the argument goes, boundary disputes are used for inter-
nal political purposes. Johnston (2013) documented such a conflict-
branding process for the case of the South China Sea, which is worth 
quoting in some length:  
In recent years, it has become increasingly common in U.S. media, 
pundit, and academic circles to describe the diplomacy of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) as newly or increasingly asser-
tive. […] Many believe that it reflects a conscious decision by the 
top leadership in the wake of the 2008–09 financial crisis to be 
much more proactive in challenging U.S. interests in East Asia and, 
indeed, elsewhere around the world. The new assertiveness meme 
has “gone viral” in the U.S. media, the blogosphere, and in schol-
arly work. 
Johnston went on to show that the observed assertiveness was in fact 
not as new as portrayed to be and, further, that it is not really clear what 
being “assertive” actually means. More recently, Johnston scrutinised the 
related claim that rising popular nationalism in China was responsible for 
China’s coercive diplomacy in the South China Sea, finding that, in fact, 
it “may not be a critically important variable constraining Chinese for-
eign policy” (Johnston 2017). I do not claim that there is a direct link 
between branding China as assertive/aggressive in the South China Sea, 
potentially in response to domestic pressures from Chinese nationalists, 
on the one hand, and branding the leaders of other states as unfriendly 
troublemakers, on the other hand. Nevertheless, dominant discourses 
about aggressive Chinese strategies in the South China Sea are likely to 
leave a mark on how commentary frames other boundary issues, includ-
ing among Southeast Asian states. At the very least, Johnston (2017: 9) 
offers one generalisable conclusion: regardless of whether their content 
is true, “assumptions, conventional wisdoms, and memes that are circu-
lated in the media, among pundits, and in academia […] are being rapidly 
reproduced in an era of digital and social media.” Given the negative 
effects perceptions of bad intent almost surely have on the prospect of 
cooperation in a dispute, it is worth starting to question the supposed 
motives in territorial conflicts.  
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The first fact to note is that disagreements over territorial belong-
ings are almost inevitable in a world organised into territorially defined 
units. In fact, conflicts over states’ jurisdictional and sovereign limits at 
land, at sea, and in the air are rather common and they tend to persist 
(Hassner 2006). A global survey of the progress on maritime delimitation 
reveals no single group of states with a higher number of delimited mari-
time boundaries as compared to another (ASIL 2017). However, the 
challenge of settling borders can be more daunting for relatively young 
states. As described above, when countries in Southeast Asia gained 
independence, the tasks they faced to this effect were myriad, while their 
capacity to inspect the areas in question, revise international standards, 
and negotiate with their neighbours was scarce. Even Thailand, which 
already had an administrative unit in charge of borders, resorted to ar-
chives in Europe to carry out the necessary delimitation. Some of these 
problems have persisted to the current day, with Cambodia facing prob-
ably the most daunting task after decades of civil war in which most 
boundary experts perished and almost all documentary evidence was 
destroyed. Along Myanmar’s border, large, poorly demarcated stretches 
have not been accessible since they have been under the control of rebels 
and resistance groups of repressed minorities. 
Ignorance of the problems stemming from undefined borders easily 
leads to ill-informed judgements. Commentary still exhibits subliminal 
memories from two of Southeast Asia’s past wars in which expansionist 
motives were insinuated vis-à-vis Indonesia and Vietnam, respectively. In 
neither case, however, has decisive evidence come forth (Gelling 2009). 
In the case of Indonesia, Konfrontasi, a three-year, low-intensity aggres-
sion launched against the formation of Malaysia (1963–1966), was re-
membered especially outside the region as an attempt by President Su-
karno to create a Greater Indonesia (Indonesia Raya) that would include 
all Malay areas in the region. Yet, there is no evidence showing that terri-
torial interests played a role in this conflict (Mackie 1974). The existence 
of expansionist motives appears indeed rather unlikely given that at that 
time, the idea of an Indonesia Raya had already disappeared from the 
relevant discourses (Tarling 2004: 151). Instead, Indonesia became an 
example of a state offering substantive concessions in several boundary 
negotiations for the benefit of having an agreement in place.7 
The other emblematic case of supposed revisionism is Vietnam, a 
country that had expanded southwards for centuries only to be stopped 
                                                 
7 On the treaties with Malaysia, see Forbes (2014: 41); with Australia, see King 
(2002); with Singapore, Forbes (1995: 24–25); with Thailand, Prescott (1993). 
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by the European colonialists. In the run-up to Vietnam’s invasion of 
Democratic Kampuchea in December 1978, territorial conflicts over the 
land border and islands in the Gulf of Thailand led to violent clashes. 
But after the initial phase of the conflict, the boundary question faded 
into the background (Heder 1979). At this stage, observers agree that it 
was the Cambodian Khmer Rouge rather than Vietnam that brought the 
conflict to a point of no return (Heder 1979; Chanda 1986: 206). After 
Hanoi had replaced the Khmer Rouge with a new puppet regime, the 
two sides signed several border agreements. As noted above, however, 
none of these favoured one or the other party in any obvious way. 
Another set of claims that should be treated with caution holds that 
state leaders have used territorial conflicts to divert the public’s attention 
away from internal problems or to rally public support in order to bol-
ster their legitimacy. Both arguments are based on the intuitive and well-
researched insight that the creation of an out-group can foster in-group 
cohesion. While it is relatively easy to identify an upcoming election, a 
political scandal, or signs of an economic crisis each time a territorial 
issue turns into a public controversy, it is often forgotten that the crea-
tion of an external enemy is a successful strategy only if an in-group 
already exists (Stein 1976). Southeast Asian states are generally not the 
strong, inclusive nation-states that fit this characteristic, and there is no 
reason to believe that this fact has gone unnoticed by its governing elites 
(Alagappa 1995). In fact, to maintain internal and external order, South-
east Asian governments have relied on fostering relations with neigh-
bouring states much more than on stirring conflict among each other. 
Perhaps the only case where it is possible to identify popular hatred 
between two Southeast Asian countries is the anti-Vietnamese attitudes 
prevalent in Cambodia, but in this case antagonism cannot be traced to 
mobilisation strategies by the government. 
There is no doubt that governments have taken advantage in dis-
putes portraying themselves as defendants of a “national” cause. Yet, to 
say that leaders deliberately create conflict for internal purposes over-
states the political leverage of territorial disputes. When governments 
have evoked them to increase popular support, they have done so in 
measured ways. Consider the example mentioned earlier, the Thai–
Cambodian conflict over the border at the temple of Preah Vihear. At a 
time when tensions between the two countries were running high, Cam-
bodian Prime Minister Hun Sen embarrassed the Thai government of 
Abhisit Vejjajiva in a blatantly provocative move by declaring that he had 
appointed Abhisit’s political rival Thaksin Shinawatra as his personal 
advisor (Phnom Penh Post 2009). In the preceding months, the dispute had 
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clearly boosted the popularity of Hun Sen, but well aware of the dangers 
that momentary mass manifestations of aggressive nationalism can pre-
sent, he took measures to ensure the conflict would not escalate beyond 
his control. In an immediately following press conference, Hun Sen 
assuaged public sentiments, explaining that having examined the disput-
ed border, “we decide[d] to withdraw paratroops number 911 from 
Preah Vihear area to the camp, and one week from now, [there will be a] 
complete withdrawal [of the troops]” (The Nation 2010).  
Domestic politics are also frequently evoked in the case of quarrels 
between Indonesia and Malaysia (Chong 2012), including the already 
mentioned series of incidents over undefined maritime boundaries. 
These disputes see protestors taking to the streets of the Indonesian 
capital of Jakarta on a regular basis, but in May 2009 public agitation was 
further fuelled when the press reported live from aboard the navy vessels 
navigating the conflict area. Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yud-
hoyono, himself a retired army general, had repeatedly been criticised for 
not being tough on Malaysia (Jakarta Post 2009). Nevertheless, he inter-
dicted the navy’s direct contact with the media and the tensions gradually 
began to ebb.8 
There are other examples where, far from being used for political 
purposes, governments actually suppressed territorial issues before they 
could come to the public’s attention. In some of these cases, self-cens-
orship of the press has helped the government’s cause. Take the example 
of Singapore’s authoritarian democracy (Slater 2015), where citizens have 
traditionally been prevented from playing a meaningful role in foreign 
policy making. When the ICJ was called to arbitrate a case over maritime 
features Singapore disputed with Malaysia, five years of proceedings 
(2003–2008) passed with hardly any commentary in the press. In another 
case, Brunei and Malaysia kept a set of official letters under wraps: 
signed in 2009, the agreements define the guidelines and positions of the 
two countries for future maritime- and land-boundary negotiations. In 
conclusion, while governments welcomed the unity-creating effects terri-
torial disputes sometimes had, they were also cautious about using them 
as political instruments. The next section discusses the way existing dis-
putes were managed instead. 
                                                 
8 Interview with Salim, commander of the Indonesian vessel KRI Tedong Naga, 
Jakarta, 10 December 2013. 
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How? The ASEAN Way and Southeast Asia’s 
Not Quite Anti-Legalistic Way of Addressing 
Conflict 
Like the claims discussed so far, arguments about the how of territorial 
dispute management in Southeast Asia have also tended to follow the 
dominant interpretations from the case of the South China Sea. The first 
major obstacle to moving the South China Sea disputes forward is the 
vagueness of China’s claim, stemming from a lack of clarity over its nine-
dash line. This, together with China’s rejection of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling in a case brought before the tribunal by the 
Philippines, reinforced a long-standing (Western) perception of China as 
a country where law and legal instruments had traditionally little signifi-
cance (Ruskola 2013). Similar perceptions have existed about other Asian 
states as well, especially those of Southeast Asia, which are said to have 
developed a particular informal, anti-legalistic way of conflict manage-
ment commonly cited as part of the “ASEAN Way” (Acharya 1998). 
Thus, when the Philippines decided in 2013 to seek arbitration regarding 
its maritime-boundary conflict with China, Manila’s move was viewed as 
a brusque departure from ASEAN’s traditional approach, including by 
many within the organisation. With a view to the management of territo-
rial disputes generally, however, Southeast Asian states appear to have 
been less anti-legalistic than the common reading of the ASEAN Way 
suggests.  
Before discussing the ostensible informality of the ASEAN Way, it 
is necessary to define what the ASEAN Way is and whether it has played 
a role in the management of interstate disputes. In contrast to the discus-
sion above, where I argued that ASEAN had no role as an independent 
actor in interstate conflict, the effect ascribed to the ASEAN Way is an 
indirect one of gradually changing the preferences and identities of its 
members (Ba 2005). Does ASEAN have a particular working mode that 
socialises states into using informal ways of conflict management? 
The ASEAN Way refers to a set of procedures and principles in-
cluding non-intervention into the affairs of another state, informality and 
deliberation as instruments for decision-making, and face-saving to safe-
guard the dignity of others (Busse 1999; Kivimäki 2001).9 To understand 
the relevance of the now well-known concept, it is worth recounting that 
the often forgotten origins of the term go back to ASEAN’s first-
                                                 
9 Connoisseurs of the organisation know that the ASEAN Way also refers to 
golf sessions, karaoke, and extended dinner parties. 
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generation leaders, for whom the ASEAN Way described the associa-
tion’s ineptitude to generate leadership.10 Forced to operate on the basis 
of the minimum common denominator, ASEAN diplomats adopted the 
term “ASEAN Way” – not without an air of irony – in reference to 
themselves. Its negative connotation notwithstanding, governments now 
had a unifying concept that served to prevent potential temptations by 
individual members to deviate from the majority line. 
In the 1990s, academia became interested in the idea of the ASEAN 
Way to theorise about identities in international politics (Acharya 2001; 
See Seng Tan 2009; Roberts 2011). The term gained an increasingly posi-
tive connotation, as it was directly related to ASEAN’s post-Cold War 
successes and the organisation’s enlargement from six to ten members, 
who subsequently set themselves the ambitious goal of becoming a 
community of states in the economic, political, and socio-cultural realms 
(ASEAN 1997). Due to the closeness between academia and politics that 
is typical in Southeast Asia, the positively connoted ASEAN Way was 
quickly included into the training curricula for the region’s future diplo-
mats. Henceforth, observers could hardly ignore the importance 
ASEAN’s policymakers attached to consensus, mutual respect, and dia-
logue. Nonetheless, the degree of the ASEAN Way’s particularism and 
its corresponding explanatory power should not be overestimated.  
As Acharya noted early on, some of the ASEAN Way principles are 
foundational principles of the modern state system (Acharya 2001: 51–
56). Such is the principle of non-intervention, which, on top of that, has 
been interpreted rather flexibly in Southeast Asia (Jones 2012). Similarly, 
deliberation and face-saving have always belonged to the standard reper-
toire of the world’s most able diplomats. ASEAN has abstained from 
formal voting, something that has long been practised in South Ameri-
ca’s Mercosur (Southern Common Market) and even at the United Na-
tions. The evidence also fails to indicate that Southeast Asian states 
avoided legal instruments generally – and, in border disputes, more than 
other states did. From the very days of independence, the future mem-
bers of ASEAN relied on international law. Indonesia and the Philip-
pines signed a Friendship Treaty in 1951, whose Article II stipulates that 
conflicts between the two countries that cannot be resolved by diploma-
cy or mediation must be referred to the International Court of Justice. 
The first Southeast Asian countries to accept the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ in a territorial conflict were Cambodia and Thailand in 1962. Six 
                                                 
10 Interview with Barry Desker, long-time Singaporean foreign service officer, 
Singapore, 4 October 2013. 
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decades later, in 2011, Cambodia asked the Court to interpret the verdict 
and the two parties met again in The Hague. Earlier, during the Cold 
War, Southeast Asian states had effectively refrained from using legalistic 
means of conflict resolution. However, this was due to the politicisation 
suffered by international tribunals and courts in the bipolar context of 
superpower competition rather than to a visibly anti-legalistic attitude of 
Southeast Asia proper.  
As noted above, since the 1990s several countries in the region have 
decided to bring their disputes before a legal entity. Although the litiga-
tions were in themselves a new experience for countries such as Singa-
pore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, all of them had practical knowledge in 
using international law in pursuit of their foreign policy goals. One out-
standing example is Tommy Koh of Singapore, a pioneer from the non-
Western world for his contribution to international law. Amongst other 
influential positions, Koh chaired the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea (1980–1982), in which Southeast Asia is remem-
bered for its contribution to a conceptual milestone decision. In the 
negotiations, Indonesia and the Philippines, together with Fiji and Mauri-
tius, achieved the formal recognition of the archipelagic state concept, 
which is now the basis of the definition of their maritime boundaries 
(Butcher 2009).  
It is interesting to note that Indonesia’s decision to bring its islands 
dispute with Malaysia to the ICJ was taken by its long-term leader, Su-
harto, who reportedly ignored the advice of the Foreign Ministry.11 Su-
harto was the foremost representative of Indonesia’s Javanese elite, 
which is said to have stamped its consensus culture onto the ASEAN 
Way of conflict management (Leifer 2000: 25). If we accept that the 
ASEAN Way is indeed less anti-legalist in essence than commonly as-
sumed, however, one may wonder why informality has prevailed in dis-
course, though not in practice. Looking back to the origins of ASEAN, 
the answer suggests itself that it was the still lively spirit of Bandung and 
the anti-colonial movement that framed international law critically as an 
instrument that had served Western domination. In any case, even if the 
ASEAN states chose an identity construct that de-emphasised legalistic 
and formal means of interstate conduct, it did not prevent them from 
relying on international law frames, including in dealing with territorial 
disputes.  
                                                 
11 Interview with Hasjim Djalal, then ambassador at-large for the Law of the Sea 
and Maritime Affairs, Jakarta, 25 November 2013.  
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Conclusions 
My goal in this article was to append rather than to refute a set of com-
mon perceptions about the management of territorial conflicts in South-
east Asia. These, I argued, have been examined through the lens of the 
South China Sea disputes, a set of conflicts that is not readily comparable 
to other territorial dispute cases in the region. First, the article showed 
that it is necessary to distinguish between the role that external actors 
and ASEAN have played in the security of Southeast Asia generally and 
in the context of bilateral disputes specifically. Neither the great powers 
nor ASEAN as independent actors are key to explaining how the re-
gion’s territorial problems have been managed. Moreover, criticism of 
ASEAN’s lack of action in these contexts should be measured against 
the organisation’s stated aims, which have generally quite explicitly ex-
cluded bilateral issues. The second perception the article put into per-
spective is the view that territorial conflicts are driven by bad intentions, 
be these expansionist motives or the goal of creating an external enemy 
in order to increase domestic approval ratings. Quite naturally, Southeast 
Asian politicians tended to exploit problems for internal purposes when 
they arose. However, diversionary conflicts have not been the norm, 
because if they were, the region would have seen more armed clashes 
occur. The main security objective of Southeast Asian states has been to 
maintain internal stability, and external conflicts hardly serve this pur-
pose. 
How then did states manage territorial disputes before they could 
escalate? I summed up a third common perception under the premise 
that there is an exceptional ASEAN Way of conflict management in 
Southeast Asia characterised by an informal, anti-legalistic approach. 
However, adopting a less exceptionalist perspective that emphasises 
opportunities, I provided an alternative reading, showing that Southeast 
Asian states were all but hesitant to resort to legal instruments of dispute 
settlement if they found favourable conditions. 
What will Southeast Asia’s territorial disputes look like in the future? 
There is little doubt that the conflicts in the South China Sea will domi-
nate the region’s security agenda for years, if not decades, to come. In 
this case, the ASEAN claimant states have decidedly stuck to their un-
written agreement that some form of settlement needs to be reached 
with China before any attempt is made to resolve overlapping claims 
amongst themselves. Thus, the intra-ASEAN disputes in the South Chi-
na Sea will most likely remain dormant for a considerable time to come. 
There is little to suggest that developments in the South China Sea 
will have a significant impact on how other territorial disputes in the 
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region will be dealt with in the future. A considerable number of border 
questions remain unresolved, and it may well be the case that new dis-
putes arise. One of the biggest challenges ahead for the region is the 
border between Myanmar and its ASEAN neighbours, Laos and Thai-
land. If Myanmar moves forward in its political transition, it will have to 
face the difficult task of demarcating a border that for decades has been 
characterised by violence between the state’s security forces, armed 
groups, and criminal gangs. If the process follows the same patterns as 
described here, it will be a strictly bilateral process governed by the desire 
not to let any dispute escalate. Because politics are at times more com-
plex than that, however, it is worth bearing in mind the lesson history 
has taught: good fences make good neighbours. 
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